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  Does VC reputation affect function of lockup agreement? 
He Kejia 
 
Abstract:
Instead of perceiving lockup agreement and VC-backing as exogenous variables, 
this paper employs the VC-backed IPO data and takes a closer examination on the 
specific effect of VC reputation, which impacts the choice of lockup length and return 
and volume abnormality around lockup expiry. Contrary to the commitment 
hypothesis proposed by previous literatures, the data suggests that less VC-backed 
companies tend to choose a longer lockup agreement as a compensation device and 
those companies backed by more reputable VC experience less negative abnormal 
return and less abnormal volume around lockup expiry.   
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 Does VC Reputation Affect Function of Lockup Agreement? 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Lockup period refers to an abstention period of time when insiders are restricted from 
selling their personally owned shares in particular initial public offering (IPO) and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEO). As a restriction of the “selling ability” of existing 
shareholders, such agreement prevents prospective investors from being harmed since 
the incumbent shareholders such as management team, venture capitalists and 
investment banks have superior insider information over outsiders. Using this 
mechanism, it is more likely that interests of both sides are properly aligned.   
 
There are several motivations underlying the lockup period arising from previous 
scholars’ research. Brav and Gompers (2003) propose the lockup agreement as a 
“signaling solution to an adverse selection problem, a commitment solution to a moral 
hazard problem and a rent extraction mechanism by powerful underwriters.” 
Moreover, there are other explanations to the lockup agreement including 
downward-sloping demand curves, underwriter compensation and boilerplates. 
Different researches support one of these alternative explanations to the existence of 
lockup agreement. 
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As an important source of external financing, venture capital (VC) plays actively in 
the IPO market, especially for the growth companies such as biotechnology and 
high-tech industry. They are adding values by selecting investments and negotiation 
deals, allocating effort efficiently and monitoring and advising portfolio companies. 
Reputation is a valuable asset to provide firms with competitive advantages (Kreps 
and Wilson, 1982, Milgrom and Roberts 1982) and a crucial success driver for this 
industry since VC, as a specialized and successful industry (Gompers et al. 2006) face 
a large number of competitions among them. However, the measure to define the 
“Reputation” is still vague and not standardized.   
 
When examining the VC effect on IPOs, most literatures do not differentiate the 
reputation effect of VCs. Rather, they treat VC-backing and Non VC-backing as an 
important factor and look at different effects of it. Acting as a certification to the 
entrepreneurial firms they are investing, treating all VCs equally is not plausible since 
large, reputable VCs obviously make a more significant impact on a successful IPO 
and post-IPO performance.   
 
This paper extends the conventional discussion on VC-backing IPOs to a more 
specific and detailed angle, which sheds lights on the VC reputation effect on the 
choice of lockup agreement and the price and volume abnormality around lockup 
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 agreement expiry. More specifically, this paper contributes in the following aspects. 
 
Firstly, rather than treating both lockup agreement and VC-related variables as 
dummy variable taking either 1 or 0, which is common in previous literatures, I treat 
VC reputation as measurable and use continuous variables as its proxy. By this way, I 
look further the relationship between VC reputation and lockup length.   
 
Secondly, aside from the lockup length determinant of VC-backing, I provide 
empirical evidence that VC reputation could also affect the length of lockup 
agreement, employing both probit and logit regressions. Furthermore, the positive 
relationship between VC reputation and lockup length substantiates the signaling and 
commitment device hypothesis. 
 
Thirdly, I separate the VC reputations into two different groups and using two 
reputation candidates to proxy for VC reputation respectively. In addition, I find the 
asset under management (AUM) and other syndication investment intensity variables 
are more robust and reliable proxies for VC reputations.   
 
Fourthly, with regard to the abnormal return and volume around lockup expiry, 
previous literatures have documented more negative abnormal return for VC-backing 
IPOs. Within the VC-backed group, I found firms backed by more reputable venture 
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 capital funds tend to have less negative abnormal return and abnormal volume.   
 
The paper is organized as the following: Chapter 2 will briefly review previous 
literatures concentrating on lockup agreement and venture capital and their roles in 
prior, at and post IPO period; Chapter 3 discussed the data source and development of 
two major hypothesis; Chapter 4 provides the descriptive analysis and reputation 
candidate validation process; Chapter 5 sheds lights on the relationship between VC 
reputations and lockup agreements, using various tests; Chapter 6 discussed the stock 
return and volume abnormality with the existence of VC reputation in addition to 
VC-backing; Chapter 7 extends the discussion and concludes the paper. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Lockup Agreement 
2.1.1 Function of Lockup Agreement 
The function lockup agreement generally falls into three categories, signaling, 
commitment and alternatives such as downward-sloping demand curves and 
underwriter compensation which has intrigued extensive body of literatures focusing 
on this topic. 
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) show that to solve the adverse selection problem, information 
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 asymmetry attenuation can be accomplished by investing in their own firms and 
“abstaining from selling secondary shares”, insiders of high-quality firms signal 
information to potential investors who in turn use the information to more accurately 
value the business. 
 
Gale and Stiglitz (1989) show that insiders could immediately sell their overvalued 
shares after fooling investors. Furthermore, Welch (1989) and Chemmanur (1993) 
solved the problem by adding a second exogenous selling date in the form of a 
follow-on SEO. In their models, it’s costly for low-quality firm insiders to mimic high 
quality firms and “true value of the firms will be revealed” before the exogenous sell 
date- SEO. Moreover, Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) suggest that lockups add value since 
“any negative information being withheld is likely to be divulged before the shares 
can be sold, reducing the benefit of withholding the information.” 
 
Brav and Gompers (2003) perceived the lockup agreement as a commitment device to 
alleviate the moral hazard problem existing in the insiders. Referring to hidden action 
after the contract is formalized, moral hazard is prevalent in the insiders since they 
could “shirk, consume perquisites, engage in entrenchment activities, or avoid risky 
but profitable projects at the expense of outside investors who are unable to monitor 
insiders’ behavior”. Thus, lockup periods functions as a temporary contract or 
commitment, imposing restriction of selling ability to insiders and forcing managers 
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 who own shares to bear some of the burden of shirking and consumption to alleviate 
intensity of moral hazard. 
 
The distinguishing characteristics differentiating signaling from commitment 
explanation are the timing and nature of the information asymmetry. From insiders’ 
perspective, they possess “more information of their quality” prior to IPO with the 
signaling explanation and “more information of their effort” post-IPO with the 
commitment explanation.   
 
For downward sloping demand curve explanation, insiders use the lockup device to 
manipulate the supply of the stocks (by intentionally restricting the sale of shares). 
When facing a downward sloping demand curve, they could obtain a higher price for 
the IPO. Consequently, insiders benefit from a higher price for secondary shares and a 
higher price for primary shares. This explanation fails since it ignores two important 
presumptions to the validation of it: inadequate substitute and inefficient market. 
Under the situation where stocks are almost homogenous except for some “unique 
stocks”, there are adequate substitute stocks which would easily replace the current 
stocks. Moreover, if the lockup agreement is known to the public, this information 
would be impounded into the efficient price of the stock. If this information is not 
reflected in the current price, investors and arbitragers could profit by shorting the 
high-priced shares prior to expiry and buying back at a lower price. The empirical 
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 evidence found by Field and Hanka (2001) also eliminate the possible downward 
sloping curve explanation. 
 
2.1.2 Lockup agreement and IPO underpricing 
IPO underpricing is a prevailing phenomenon as documented by various researchers 
and literatures, with different hypotheses focusing on aspects of the relationships 
among investors, issuers and investment bankers that take firms public. There are 
three main hypotheses centering around the underpricing phenomenon, which are 
strategic underpricing hypothesis (Aggarwal et al. (2001)), the wealth loss 
minimization hypothesis (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)) and the prospect theory 
model (Loughran and Ritter (2002)). Underpricing mainly functions as a mechanism 
to provide liquidity and more share retentions by pre-IPO owners generally strengthen 
underpricing phenomenon more substantially. 
 
By affecting the liquidity, the same magnitude of underpricing may lead to a larger 
number of investors following the stock, and the trading will be more active. The 
relation between IPO underpricing and liquidity will be stronger when there is lockup. 
On the other hand, if lockup reduces liquidity, the effect of lockup on the relationship 
between underpricing and liquidity will not be predictable and the relation between 
share retention and underpricing will depend on empirical results. 
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 2.1.3 Price effect around lockup expiry 
Many previous literatures have focused on the price effect around lockup period 
initiated by the pioneering work of Field and Hanka (2001), Bradley et al. (2001) and 
Ofek and Richardson (2000). In their researches, there exists a significant increase in 
trading volume and price drop after the lockup agreement expires. To lend a more 
extensive insight, Field and Hanka (2001) proposed several potential reasons to 
explain the negative abnormal returns around lockup expirations from 5 perspectives. 
Firstly, the negative abnormal return may be resulted from an increase in the 
proportion of trades at the bid by the insiders. Secondly, the company with lockup 
agreement may face price pressures from insider sell orders around lockup expiration. 
Thirdly, it could be explained by increased transaction costs caused by insider trades. 
Fourthly, downward sloping demand curve for stocks and permanent price drops may 
explain the negative abnormal return. Lastly, there is a consistent worse-than-expected 
insider sale upon lockup expiration. 
 
Discussing the price abnormality around lockup expiry, there are more literatures 
focusing on the short sale constraints and their impact on price efficiency. Ofek and 
Richardson (2003) argue that “short sale constraints and heterogeneous market beliefs 
may lead to optimistically-biased Internet stocks”. They found out that Internet stocks 
are more over-priced when lockup agreement exists and prices of them drops more 
significantly compared with non-Internet stocks. They also attributed the internet 
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 bubble to the unprecedented lockup expiration and insider selling. 
 
As a general phenomenon prevailing both in Internet and non-Internet stocks, Geczy, 
Musto and Reed (2002) show that “the negative price impact of lockup expiration is 
significant even for IPO stocks that are cheap and easy to borrow”. Consequently, the 
behavior of pre-expiration buying of IPO stocks remains to be explained when there is 
clear information about future price drop. 
 
Insider trading has been perceived as an important factor to explain the price effect 
around lockup expiry, especially for new and young IPO stocks. The information 
advantage is persistent among the corporate insiders, underwriters, and venture 
capitalists who back up these IPOs are more likely to trade on this precious private 
information. As discussed above, lockup agreement is introduced as a commitment 
scheme (Brav and Gompers (2003)) to alleviate the moral hazard problem corporate 
insider’s hidden action on the private insiders. They found out that lockup agreement 
is more prevalent in the firms with more severe information asymmetry. To a more 
specific level, Cao, Field and Hanka (2003) have shed some light on the effect of 
market liquidity provided by insider trading upon lockup expiration. They have shown 
that spread and depth, which are two measures of market liquidity, do not deteriorate 
after the lockup expiration.   
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 2.2 Venture Capital 
2.2.1 Function of Venture Capital 
As a crucial financing source for small and medium-sized firms, especially 
technology and bio-tech companies, VCs are playing a more and more important role 
to bring companies to public. They pool money from various sources, normally from 
institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, 
foundation and banks, leveraging on their comparative advantage to select growing 
companies who have a potential to succeed (to go public or be acquired by other 
companies). As noted in Gompers and Lerner (1999), the dominating structure for 
VCs is limited partnership and itself as the general partner in it. Moreover, they 
normally charge  annual management fee plus the profit they make from successful 
portfolio company investment. 
 
After securing investment from their limited partners, VCs actively participate into 
young and growing companies, particularly with strong interest in technology and 
bio-tech companies. (Fenn et al. 1997). As an investor who usually represents certain 
voice in the board room, VCs closely monitor the management of the companies. 
They normally provide financing source, valuable advice and guidance on the 
development and management of the growing companies. Since entrepreneurs in 
these small ventures are normally with less experience, VCs are bringing 
“value-added” into the day-to-day operations. Moreover, to ensure their own return on 
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 capital injected, they negotiate complex terms, control right representation and its 
monitoring and advisory role in the growing companies. 
 
Control right, board representation and other involvement of VCs are negotiated and 
pre-determined before VCs make their investment. Although VCs provide advice 
through their representation in the board room, they are not closely involved into the 
daily operations of the business venture they put stake on. However, they still 
performing their monitoring role through many channels, Lerner (1995) found out that 
VC representation in the board increases significantly around the time of CEO 
turnover while other shareholders remain the same. VCs; stockholdings in a firm 
determine the extent of their incentives to influence the firm’s financial reporting. 
When VCs holdings are low, they have limited influence on management’s disclosure 
decisions, and the private wealth benefits from stock sales are also limited. As 
suggested in Kahn and Winton (1998), higher VC holdings represent a higher ability 
of VCs to secure their private benefits. Through the proxy voting rights of board of 
directors, VCs also have “the power to make decisive influence on the composition of 
management team.” (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) Moreover, compared to non-VC 
backed companies, VC-backed companies have a more active monitoring function 
from their VC investors. 
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 2.2.2 VC Reputations 
Reputation is an important characteristic in determining the terms of contracts, which 
easily change the investor or entrepreneur’s incentive. There is a prevailing consensus 
that contractual relationships that are based partly on the reputations of the parties can 
generate higher returns for the parties. It could be demonstrated in the following 
aspects. Firstly, the preference of venture capitalists to raise funds from institutions 
demonstrates that the cost of dealing with individual investors is expected to be higher. 
Secondly, the ability of established entrepreneurs to raise capital more easily than 
first-time entrepreneur and indicates that investors rely on the experience of the 
entrepreneur and demonstrated commitment as an element of the negotiation. Thirdly, 
the more reputable venture capitalists are able to charge higher management fees 
since investors are anticipating more superior performance from those more reputable 
venture capitalists. 
 
Another reason that venture capital firm is willing to invest in reputation is that, 
portfolio companies’ human capital is specific to venture capitalists, the company 
benefits by developing a reputation for not selling shares publicly in IPOs that are 
overpriced. Compared with a not-so-reputable venture capitalist, it would be more 
capable to sell shares and deal with its internal resources with less concern about 
negative market reaction. However, venture capital funds may seek to build a 
reputation which is not in the best alignment of interest of the companies in which 
  12 
 
 they invest. This is also supported by Gompers’ (1996) “grandstanding” hypothesis. 
 
In most of previous literatures, they do not differentiate different characteristics VCs 
possess, such as VC quality and reputations. Rather, they perceive VCs as uniform 
group and regard VC backup as an exogenous variable. However, as revealed by Hsu 
(2004), entrepreneurs address intensively on the VC reputation and are three times 
more willing to accept offerings from VCs with higher reputation. Moreover, they 
even could accept a 10% to 14% discount on their business valuation if the offer 
comes from a more reputable VCs.   
 
There are no consistent measures to determine the VC reputation accurately since it is 
usually a subjective assessment rather than objective. However, within the industry, 
peer VCs are more likely to assess their competitors’ reputation since deal syndication 
is a normal practice among VCs. (Lerner 1994). This is an indication that interactions 
among industry insiders would provide valuable information about certain VC 
through its past deal experience and track of record. Moreover, through syndicating 
with reputable VCs, the information and resources are more efficiently allocated 
which could help portfolio companies create more value. (Hochberg et al. 2006) 
 
As discussed, VC reputation is a subjective measure which would not gain consensus 
among different investors. However, in earlier studies, many literatures select a 
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 variety of different measures to proxy for VC reputation. As mentioned in Megginson 
and Weiss (1991), they proxy for underwriter reputation by the market share of 
completed IPOs. Gompers and Lerner (1999) proposed that capital under management 
as the proxy for VC reputation. Moreover, VC firm age (Gompers (1996) and Lee and 
Wahal (2004)), number of IPOs VC backed (Lee and Wahal (2004)) are also used to 
measure the VC reputation. 
 
2.2.3 VC Certification and IPO 
As proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1991), VC certification hypothesis is 
formulated to capture the valuable certification role of venture capitalists in the 
process of IPO. It generally assumes that the agent has reputational capital at stake 
with an intrinsic value greater than the possible one-off gain obtained from certifying 
falsely about the value of issuing firm. It is assumed that it is costly for the issuing 
firm to get access to the certifying agent and benefit from its reputational capital. 
 
VC investment is a repeated game and reputation is accumulated through their 
successful investment track of record. Thus, with more experience and successful 
investment history, VCs are more likely to raise future investment into it. Gompers 
(1996) noticed a “grandstanding” phenomenon which is prevailing in young VCs. As 
investors with less experience and investment history, young venture capital firms 
tend to grandstand and signal their ability to potential investors. They also tend to 
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 bring their portfolio companies to public earlier than older VCs as an action to 
establish reputation and raise new capital injection. The proposition of 
“grandstanding” is largely related to reputation concern and many literatures have 
supported this hypothesis. As Lee and Wahal (2004) mentioned, flow of capital into a 
VC firm is positively related to VC age and the number of IPOs done by the firm. 
Reputation concern also deters VCs from behaving opportunistically. 
 
Furthermore, more reputable VCs are associated with greater post-IPO involvement 
and stronger corporate governance. Gompers and Lerner (1998), and Field and Hanka 
(2001) report that VCs frequently keep a portion of their equity stake after the lockup 
period expires. Baker and Gompers (2003) report that VC backed IPO firms have 
more independent in their board rooms and less powerful CEOs. Hochberg (2005) 
finds VC-backed IPO firms are “less likely to have a dual CEO-chairman of the board 
of directors.”   
 
2.2.4 VC reputation and post-IPO performance 
Following Ivanov et al. (2008), measuring VC reputation with various variables, more 
reputable VC is associated with stronger post-IPO performance, frequency of later 
IPOs and higher acquisition premium, which are all indicators that reputation really 
adds value to the pos-IPO stage through various ways.   
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 For instance, Andrade et al. (2001) found out that takeover premium is the US is over 
30% and it is more significant for the M&A deals with more reputable VCs, with a 
higher frequency and higher average takeover premium paid. This could be explained 
by the conjecture that higher ranked VCs would strengthen their investment into the 
portfolio companies more effectively, by promoting more frequent acquisitions and 
negotiations with potential buyers.   
 
Moreover, VC’s private network plays an important role in the post-IPO stage to 
explain the more superior performance of companies backed by more reputable VCs. 
As documented by Hellmann and Puri (2002), and Hochberg et al. (2007b), VCs’ own 
networks are highly leveraged to help the portfolio companies develop. They find that 
after VCs invest in the firm, more experienced executives, lawyers, accountants and 
investment bankers are gathered to help the companies to succeed. (Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989)). Furthermore, with a more influential network, VCs would achieve 
greater success, which would be indicated by the proportion of portfolio companies 
that have gone to IPOs. (Hochberg et al. (2007b)). Ivanov et al. (2008) also document 
that companies backed by more reputable VCs tend to have more highly-ranked 
financial intermediaries, lead underwriters, law firms, auditors and larger VC 
syndicates around IPOs. 
 
However, these studies have not differentiated among VCs with different reputations, 
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 and there is not a reliable reputation measure with respect to this problem. 
Consequently, I am trying to find a proper reputation measure which leads to a larger 
abnormal negative return around lock-up period. 
 
2.3 Lockup and VC Reputation 
With regard to the determinant of length of lockup agreement, venture backing has 
been tested to be an important factor while it is employed as a mechanism to eliminate 
information asymmetry. As illustrated by the previous literatures, most of the 
researches are concentrating on the parallel development of the function of lockup 
agreement and VC reputation in the pre or post-IPO stage of certain companies. 
Moreover, they are mostly treated as exogenous variables rather than dependent 
variables per se. However, contrary to the “grandstanding” hypothesis which 
motivates the less reputable VCs to bring companies to IPO, they may use longer 
lockup agreement as their device to compensate for their lack of reputation. 
Consequently, more reputable VCs tend to use longer period of lockup agreement. 
More discussions shedding specific light to more detailed VC reputation measures 
will elaborated in the following sections. The general functions of lockup agreement 
and venture capitalists are shown in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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Chapter 3: Data and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
To lend a more specific angle to the specific function of VC reputation, I collect 1998 
to 2007 IPO data from Securities Data Company (SDC) database and its subsection 
VentureXpert database for the VC-related information such as VC incorporation date, 
asset under management, portfolio companies, investment round and amount, number 
of firms invested in certain company and IPO-related information such as cusip, 
industry, IPO date, IPO proceeds, lockup days, lockup expiry date, so on and so forth. 
The major difference between this data collection and those in previous literatures is 
that the data I use in this paper are all VC-backed IPOs rather than an overall IPO data. 
As a convention, the IPO data exclude closed-end funds, REITs and ADRs. Stock 
return and trading volume data are obtained from CRSP. Moreover, for a specific test, 
I need the company incorporation date, which could be obtained from Jay Ritter’s 
website (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). The descriptive analysis 
VC-backed IPOs are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2 Reputation Candidates 
Although reputation per se is subjective and difficult to evaluate, they could be 
generally categorized into two groups which are firm-related prior deal experience 
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 and syndication investment intensity. These are two intuitive indicators: for the former 
measure, from the entrepreneurs’ perspective, VC’s past performance, representing 
their expertise and track of record in the industry, is crucial to guide them through the 
potential problems and towards a successful destination. This is also supported by 
survey result of Hsu (2004); for the latter category, VCs tend to syndicate their 
investment to enhance their rate of return by mimicking the investment practice of 
larger or more successful peers. This is supported by evidence provided in Gale and 
Stiglitz (1989) and Lerner (1994). In previous researches, there are several candidate 
proxies, which are capital under management and total investment, VC firm age, IPO 
market share. 
 
VC Firm Age 
VC firm age, which is calculated as the length between firm IPO date and the time 
backing VC was incorporated, has been perceived to be an important reputation proxy, 
Following Gompers (1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004), with a longer track of record 
and business operation, VCs accumulate their experience and expertise and commits 
less mistakes. Moreover, with a longer Age, it is more likely for certain VC to survive 
in the competitive industry, which is also an indication of higher reputation. 
 
Asset Under Management 
This measure calibrates certain VC’s capability to raise fund and invest their money. 
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 Basically, it is straightforward to assume that more reputable VCs are more likely to 
attract more fund injections. Consequently, VC AUM might be an indirect measure of 
its reputation.   
 
Syndication Investment Intensity 
As proposed by Wongsunwai (2008), syndication investment intensity has been 
employed to be an indirect measure of VC’s reputation. Since more reputable VCs 
tend to have more resources and networking to invest in certain companies, they will 
syndicate with others and have a higher average investment (AVGINV) or average 
round investment (RNDINV) in their portfolio companies.   
 
3.3 Control Variables 
To concentrate on the reputational effect of VCs, I control for other characteristics 
which are prevailing in the IPO market. As supported by Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998), natural logarithm of IPO gross proceeds (Ln Size) is an important 
characteristic in the IPO market, indicating a less risky investment with more 
established and geographically diversified firms.   
 
Moreover, as argued by Ritter (1984), issuer age per se is also an important control 
variable since older companies tend to “have more tangible assets and collateral, a 
more developed management team and longer standing customer relationships.” 
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 Furthermore, they are able to tackle the difficulties they face and risks they have by 
hand. The data could be available from Jay Ritter’s IPO data website and control 
variable is measured in its natural logarithm form Ln Age. 
 
The number of VC co-investors, which is a proxy for the VC networking the issuers 
face would be another control variable. As the company is backed by more venture 
capitalists, it tends to have a better networking and value-added certifications. This 
information is also directly available from SDC database and termed as Ln 
Co-investor. 
 
As noted by more extensive literatures such as Loughran and Ritter (2004) and 
Gompers et al. (2006), information technology firms are singled out due to their high 
reliance on the venture capitalists as financing resource and their inherent 
characteristics (high technological risk and high growth rate). Consequently, I would 
label those information technology firms with an indicator 1 and those who are not 
with 0. 
 
The detailed description of VC reputation candidates and control variables are 
documented in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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3.4 Hypothesis Development 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, less reputable VCs tend to have longer lockup days as a 
compensation device. 
 
There is a prevailing conflict between the relationship of VC reputation and lockup 
length, with diverging perspectives from VC investors and entrepreneurs. However, to 
test the signaling and commitment device argument for lockup agreement, I would 
expect the VC reputation is negatively related to lockup length since entrepreneurs 
need compensate less reputable VCs with longer commitment from them. 
 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, around lockup expiry, more reputable VCs experience less 
negative abnormal returns and less trading volumes. 
 
Since VCs are certifying the portfolio companies’ quality, in addition to providing 
financing channels and networking to them. Thus, they will monitor more closely on 
the portfolio companies’ business and be involved into their operations. Consequently, 
they will experience less negative abnormal return when they face the selling pressure 
around lock-in expiry. 
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Chapter 4: Descriptive Analysis 
 
4.1 Overall VC-backing IPO Market 
Going to public, or “Harvesting” in the VC terminology is the final stage of the 
entrepreneurial investment process and has been a critical component of VC 
investment practice. Conducting a certification role in the IPO market, it is more 
prevalent to observe an upward trend for young and growing companies backed by 
venture capitalists. There are over 900 VC-backed IPO during period of 1998 to 2007 
and the IPO proceeds from these IPOs are depicted in Figure 2. It depicts a huge 
increase in IPO volume from 1998 with 3782 million to 1999 with 20871 million by 
transaction volume. This booming market persists for two years throughout to 2000 
with a record IPO proceeds high of 25619 million, when the internet bubble bursts. 
Through the year 2000, the average time between venture capital investment and 
harvest was decreasing and harvest valuations were increasing. Consequently, new 
capital commitments grew rapidly and even the well-established venture capitals 
cannot meet the demand fast enough. This is also consistent with the fact that venture 
capitalists are in favor of the information technology sector and act as the driving 
force to bring technology companies public. However, with the increasing difficulty 
to find attractive investments and investors, this market began to consolidate in the 
year of 2001 and faced a market decline afterwards. After the IPO market crash in the 
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 Internet Bubble, VC-backing IPO market recovers steadily to around 11000 million in 
2004 and 10326 million in 2007. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
4.2 Lockup Days 
The length of lockup days is argued to be “typically” 180 days in Barlett (1995) and 
75% of the lockup agreement are reported to have 180 days of restricted period for the 
companies who have lockup provisions. However, for the VC-backed IPOs from 1998 
to 2007, the lockup days are more diverse as depicted in Table 2.   
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics on the various lockup days while “180 days” 
phenomenon still dominates the length, taking account about 58% of all the firms who 
report to have lockup agreement. Moreover, many of the companies are reported to 
have no lockup contracts with 0 days of restricted period and over 42% IPOs are 
reporting a “90 days” or shorter period of lockup days. Only about 0.57% of 
VC-backing IPOs report lockup days which are longer than 180 days. 
 
To facilitate our further analysis, I label the firms with a “180 days” or larger with a 
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 dummy 1 and call them “Standard Lockup”. Controlling for the firms with a lockup 
length greater than 180 days, I label those firms with shorter period of lockup 
agreement with 0 and call them “Short Lockup”. The basic statistic is presented in 
Panel B of Table 2. 
 
4.3 Reputation Candidates 
The reputation candidates are separated into two groups: Prior experience which 
includes  VCAGE and Asset Under Management (AUM) variables; Syndication 
investment intensity which includes AVGINV and RNDINV variables.   
 
As depicted in Table 3, the venture capital funds have a relatively short history with a 
mean age less than two decades, reflecting a young and booming industry. Although 
the form of venture capital has been existing for centuries long, its active role as a 
financing source only stems from 1970s as noted by Smith and Smith (2004). 
However, although VCs’ ages do not differ much due to the short history of the 
overall industry, their asset under management (AUM) differs extensively, ranging 
from the minimum 0.6 million to 81100 millions, with a mean of 2895.9 million. This 
indicates that the AUM variable is highly skewed, reflecting the fact that the 
capability of raising funds and investment diverge among different venture capital 
funds, irrelevant of their firm age. Calculated in thousands, the syndication investment 
intensity variable, measured by VC’s average investment and average round 
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 investment also differs largely among various firms. This is consistent with their 
capability to invest. 
 
4.4 Control variables 
IPO size, approximated by its IPO proceeds from going to public is reported in the 
control variable section in Table 3. It is reported to have an average 90 million IPO 
proceeds and the median size is about 67.5 million. Moreover, with respect to the 
issuing firm age, measuring by the difference between their founding date and IPO 
date, they have a mean length of 35 years. On average, issuing firms has a longer 
history than their VC investors, with an average 20 years of history. Regarding the 
networking ability, measured by the number of firms backing each IPO, I would 
observe an extensive syndication in the VC-backed IPOs, with 10 VC funds backing 
one IPO on average. This is consistent with previous findings that VCs, especially 
smaller and less reputable tend to follow larger and more reputable VCs in respective 
investment in portfolio companies. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
4.5 Validating the Reputation Candidates 
The pair-wise correlations of different reputation variables are reported in Table 4.   
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 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
As argued in the previous sections, the variables within either group are more closely 
related to each other while the variables across the group demonstrate a lower 
relationship with each other. This is consistent with the original conjecture that 
reputation candidates are divided into prior experience and syndication investment 
intensity. For instance, the correlation coefficient is reported to be 0.85 between 
RNDINV and AVGINV while it is 0.01 between AVGINV and VCAGE or -0.14 
between RNDINV and VCAGE. This correlation fact substantiates the expected 
grouping objectives. Furthermore, the correlation between AUM and both indicators 
of deal-specific variables is positive and highly significant, which is consistent with 
expectation that larger VCs tend to have a more substantial investment. 
 
4.6 Reputation Candidate and Control Variables 
Shedding a more profound light onto the relationship between reputation candidates 
and control variables, we would examine the partial effect of each control variable on 
the respective reputation candidate. The equation to estimate is shown as the 
following equation and the results of the estimation are reported in Table 5.: 
 
01 2 3 4 tt t t REPUTATION LNSIZE LNAGE TECHdUMMY COINVt t β βββ β =+ + + + + ε  (1) 
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 where  variable captures all the four candidates and  REPUTATION 0 β  represents a 
vector of fixed year effect.   
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
Measuring by VCAGE, AUM, AVGINV and RNDINV, the IPO size is positively 
related to reputation candidates except for VCAGE, which follows the expectation 
that larger IPOs are backed by more reputable venture capitalists, either stemming 
from their greater networking or better track of record in bringing companies to public. 
Company age seems has no significant relationship with all reputation candidate due 
to the fact that company age and VC age are independent of themselves. Moreover, 
more reputable VCs tend to be more frequent in information technology industry 
since the correlation coefficient between Techdummy and reputation candidates are 
positive, which is consistent with the result documented by Ivanov et al. (2008).This 
also make sense since many reputable VCs are investing heavily in the information 
technology sector, exemplifying by the case of Sequoia’s investment in Google, so on 
the so forth. COINV, measuring the scale of syndication investment is negatively 
correlated to reputation candidates, indicating that more reputable VCs tend to 
syndicate with fewer co-investors compared with less reputable VCs. This strengthens 
the argument that due to lack of experience and capability, less reputable VCs tend to 
herd their investment with larger and more reputable VCs. 
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Chapter 5: Testing for relationship between VC reputation and 
length of lockup 
 
5.1 Pre-contractual and post-contractual Costs 
As discussed in the section 1, lockup agreement is used as a signaling or commitment 
device when venture capitalists and entrepreneurs agree on their respective contracts. 
More specifically, it helps to alleviate the precontractual and postcontractual 
information costs.   
 
From VC investor’s perspective, precontractual costs are associated with negotiating a 
contract and arise before they make commitment and investment, due to the diverse 
information the outsiders (venture capitalists) and insiders (entrepreneurs) possess. 
This prevailing information asymmetry means that private information could be 
precious and difficult to be observed, which results into a severe adverse selection 
problem. Thus, venture capitalists need lockup agreement to differentiate the proper 
entrepreneurs from the overly optimistic ones since companies owners who are 
confident about their ventures would choose to take the lockup contract while the 
overly optimistic ones would be less willing to. As a commitment device, lockup 
agreement solves the moral hazard problem and attenuates the postcontractual costs. 
After the financial contract has been entered and the investment has been made, both 
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 parties’ incentives change. The parties may act in different ways that are not 
consistent with their original intentions. Incentive problems arise when contracts are 
incomplete and when parties cannot monitor performance perfectly. Consequently, 
lockup agreement helps venture capitalists to restrict entrepreneurs’ ability to sell 
shares. As a result of this, more reputable VCs tend to use longer lockup agreement to 
screen out the proper entrepreneurs and resolve the moral hazard problem. 
 
However, the information asymmetry exists in a bilateral way. From the 
entrepreneurs’ perspective, they are usually not aware of the reasons underlying 
venture capitalists’ interests in their companies. For example, the investor would be 
only seeking to assess it as a competitive threat and keep it from reaching the market. 
Moreover, in the postcontractual period, the entrepreneurs may want the venture 
capitalists to secure their commitment to the firm. In such a case, less reputable VC 
investors would be required to commit longer with certain venture and compensate for 
their less proven track of record.   
 
The divergence in the perspective from both contractual sides raise the key question 
that whether more reputable venture capital funds tend to choose longer lockup period. 
If so, it supports the signaling and commitment hypothesis proposed from VC’s 
perspective. If not, it supports the other way round. The answer to this key question 
depends on the empirical test. 
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5.2 Empirical test 
 
Univariate test: 
As a starting point, I test the relationship between reputation candidate and lockup 
variables using a univariate simple regression model as exemplified by the following 
equation. 
01 tt LKPDAY REPUTATION t β βε =+ +  (2) 
Where LKPDAY represents the continuous variable lockup days and REPUTATION 
represents respective reputation candidate. The simple regression result is reported in 
Table 6. To adjust for heteroskadesticity and autocorrelation, I also employed 
Newey-West test and get the adjusted t-statistic which is also reported in the same 
Table. 
 
Table 6: Univariate Simple Regression Analysis 
  VC Age  AUM  Avg Inv  Rnd Inv 
-7.03771 -2.84682 -5.82935 -4.99081 
OLS 
1.02199  0.64081  1.38709  1.31018 
t-statistic  -6.89  -4.44  -4.20  -3.81 
NW adjusted  6.01***  -4.13***  -3.94***  -3.48*** 
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However, since the lockup days have a tendency to concentrate around 180 days, I 
further separate the whole sample into group with lockup days equal or larger to 180 
days (labeled with 1 in LKPFLG variable) and those with lockup days less than 180 
days (labeled with 0). The simple linear probability equation to be tested is as 
following and the estimation result is reported in Table 7. Moreover, employing probit 
and logistic models, I also report the result in the same table.   
01 tt LKPFLG REPUTATION t β βε =+ +  (3) 
 
Table 7: Univariate Linear Probability, Probit and Logit Model Analysis 
  VC Age  AUM  Avg Inv  Rnd Inv 
-0.079*** -0.036*** -0.077*** -0.068*** 
Probit 
0.015  0.009  0.020  0.019 
      
-0.127*** -0.058*** -0.123*** -0.110*** 
Logit 
0.023  0.015  0.032  0.030 
      
0.031*** -0.014*** -0.030*** -0.027*** 
LP 
0.006  0.004  0.008  0.007 
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 Multivariate Test: 
Controlling for deal or company-specific characteristics such as the IPO size, 
company age, information technology dummy and number of co-investors backing 
those IPOs, I would report a multivariate regression employing the simple OLS, linear 
probability, probit and logit model. The equations to be estimated are shown as the 
following and the detailed results are reported as in Table 8 and Table 9. 
 
01 2 3 4 5 tt t LKPDAY REPUTATION LNSIZE LNAGE TECHdUMMY COINV β ββ β ββ =+ + + + + + ε
01 2 3 4 5 tt t
(4) 
 
LKPFLG REPUTATION LNSIZE LNAGE TECHdUMMY COINV β ββ β ββ =+ + + + + + ε  (5) 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
Explanations: 
Firstly, employing simple OLS regression estimation, linear probability, probit and 
logit models, reputation candidates are negatively correlated with lockup days or 
lockup flag which is set manually. This relationship indicates that more reputable 
venture capital funds tend to have on a shorter period of lockup days, either in the 
continuous variable case or binary choice case. For instance, as shown in Table 9 
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 Panel B, with one unit change in asset under management, the probability of the 
lockup agreement becomes equal or larger than 180 days decreases by 2.3%. If the 
modeled as logistic, the marginal effect decreases by 80% to 4.1%. This negative 
relationship does not support the signaling and commitment arguments discussed 
above and conforms to our Hypothesis 1 from the entrepreneurs’ perspective. 
 
Moreover,  VCAGE  seems not to be a consistent and reliable reputation candidate 
since its values are only significant under OLS estimation in stead of all the testing 
models I employ. Compared with the robustness of other reputation candidates 
throughout various regressions, VCAGE performs badly. Although VC firm age could 
partially reflect the knowledge and experience accumulation as required by 
entrepreneurs, the knowledge per se could be easily spilled over due to the frequent 
movement of venture capitalists within this industry. Even with a relatively young VC, 
they could establish better reputation via successful deals accomplished with the help 
of experienced venture capitalists. Consequently, it is the venture capitalists who are 
building the reputation for certain VC, rather than the VC per se. 
 
Furthermore, adjusted for heteroskadesticity and autocorrelation with Newey-West 
test, I get the downward-adjusted t-statistics. The down-ward adjustment does not 
change the significance of each prediction, which strengthens our original 
expectation. 
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Chapter 6: Reputation Candidates and Price and Volume Reaction 
around Lockup Expiry 
 
The price and volume reaction around lockup agreement expiry has attracted 
extensive body of literatures shedding lights on this topic. With respect to the venture 
capitalist-related issues, Bradley et al. (2001) find that VC-backed US IPOs are 
associated with significantly more negative abnormal returns at the lock-in expiry. 
Field and Hanka (2001), Brav and Gompers (2003) and Brau et al. (2004) also 
reported the similar patter for VC-backed US IPOs. Moreover, in the EU context, 
Espenlaub et al. (2003), Bessler and Kurth (2003) and Bertoni et al. (2002) 
documented the similar more negative abnormal returns for VC-backed IPOs. 
However, Angenendt et al. (2005) do not support these findings with French data. 
However, in all of these literatures, they treat VC as a dummy variable and are only 
interested in VC-banking or non VC-backing. However, with continuous reputation 
candidate variables in hand, I am more interested in looking specifically into how the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and abnormal volume (AV) will behave 
in response to VC backings with different reputation. 
 
6.1 CAAR and AV Calculations 
Following Brav and Gompers (2003), I calculate abnormal returns for each IPO 
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 beginning on 10 days prior to lockup expiry through to 10 days after the expiry date 
(t-10, t+10) and it is defined as the difference between the IPO firm’s buy-and-hold 
return and the benchmark buy-and-hold return. As documented by Michaely, Thaler 
and Womack (1995), I used the market value weighted index as the benchmark 
buy-and-hold return. Moreover, the equation to calculate the cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) is shown as the following: 
12 12
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To test the significance of CAAR, the t-statistic is calculated in the following 
equation: 
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where the numerator is the CAAR and s(CAR) is the standard deviation of the 
sample’s CARs, which is based on the test statistic proposed by Barber and Lyon 
(1997). 
 
To calculate the daily abnormal volume, I follow Field and Hanka (2001) to calculate 
the mean daily trading volume per firm during t-50 and t-6 and compute the 
difference between the trading volume on the event day and the mean. Moreover, the 
daily average abnormal trading volume (DAAV) is calculated using the following 
equation: 
  36 
 
 2
12 12
1
,
,, , 6
11 21
,
50
11 1
1
1 (1 )
45
t NN
it
tt i tt
ii t t
it
V
DAAV DAV
NN t t V
−
== =
−
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ==
+− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
∑∑ ∑
∑
−  (8) 
Following the t-statistic calculated in the CAAR, the t-statistic is also employed to test 
the significance of DAAV. 
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6.2 Venture Reputation 
To get a more specific view on the reputational effect on the return and volume 
abnormality around lockup expiry, I divide the whole sample into two groups: 
above-median sample and below-median sample, comparing the extent to which their 
abnormal return and volume exist. Moreover, the t-statistic given in equation (6) and 
(8) are used to test the significance of each return and volume. The results are shown 
in Table 10 and Table 11. 
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
Taking the VC reputation AUM for example, for the above-median group, it has a 
negative -2.39% abnormal return around lockup expiry while the below-median group 
has a -4.09% of negative abnormal return which is larger than the former group. 
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 Moreover, these two CAARs are all significant under 5% significance level. This 
pattern, which shows more firms backed by more reputable VCs tend to have less 
negative abnormal return, is prevalent among all the four VC reputation candidates 
we are examining except for VC age.   
 
Regarding the abnormal volume which is the DAAV measure I am proposing here, 
more reputable VCs tend to have some effect on it since abnormal volume tend to be 
less for those who are backed by more reputable VCs than those by less reputable 
ones. For instance, The abnormal volume increases from 35% to 57% if I measure VC 
reputation using AUM, implying that above-median group experience less 
abnormality in volume than the below-median group. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 
To provide more insight into the reputational effect, we further divide the sample into 
four quartiles based on each reputation candidate. I evaluate the abnormal return and 
abnormal volume following the methodology developed above and tests their 
significance. The results are shown in Table 12. The statistics I get conform to the 
original expectation that with more reputable VCs’ backing, issuer firms tend to have 
a less negative abnormal return and less abnormal volume, which puts extra weight on 
the support of Hypothesis 2. 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Discussion 
In this paper, I just shed some specific lights on the relationship of VC reputations and 
lockup agreement at two spot time, contract design and lockup expiry. However, the 
mechanism that how exactly the VC reputations are affecting the lockup length and 
the less negative abnormal return still remains a question. The venture capitalists’ role 
in monitoring and enhancing better corporate governance might be a plausible 
explanation to this question. Consequently, looking into the specific role of venture 
capitalist, such as sitting on the board, monitoring day-to-day operations and 
improving financial reporting quality would help to explain the reputation effect en 
route to the post-IPO period.   
 
Although venture capitals are not directly involved into the daily operation, they are 
affecting the corporate governance practice by monitoring the behavior of 
entrepreneurs and management team. Lerner (1995) shows that the VC’s presentation 
in the board room is higher when the CEO turnover is more frequent, while the 
number of outsiders remains the same. Consequently, it is the indirect monitoring 
which takes effect rather than direct monitoring. Researchers find that, compared to 
companies with no VC involvement, “those with direct monitoring by VCs make less 
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 use of accounting and stock based measures as explicit performance criteria in CEO 
compensation contracts”. As discussed previously, control right is pre-determined 
between VCs and portfolio companies prior to signing the contract. By making hiring 
decisions on senior management team, venture capitalists are exerting their influence 
and make the company more transparent (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003). As a result of 
this, information asymmetry is better settles under more active indirect monitoring, 
which is more prevalent in more reputable VCs. 
 
The characteristics of board and financial reporting quality of companies are also 
affected by venture capitalists’ reputation and presence. VC-backed companies, 
especially companies backed by more reputable VCs, tend to have more independence, 
which could be measured by the proportion of independent VC directors in the board. 
Hochberg (2005)  reports that VC-backed IPO companies have “more independent 
boards, audit and compensation committees, and a higher likelihood of separating the 
roles of CEO and chairman of the board, higher stock market reaction to the 
announcement of poison pill adoption, as well as lower earnings management in the 
year of the IPO”. Other researchers also relate the less abnormal return to better 
corporate governance.   
 
Moreover, the reputation candidates I am using here are “objective” since they are 
directly observable. However, more “subjective” reputation measure, such as 
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 reputation quality score could be developed to get a comprehensive understanding of 
the reputation effect and be used as an overall proxy. In fact, some researchers have 
already delved into the development of VC quality score and yielded insightful 
results. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
In this paper, I revolve the traditional method treating lockup agreement and 
VC-backing as two exogenous variables and take a closer look at the VC reputation 
effect on lockup agreement and the return and volume abnormality.   
 
The analysis conforms to the two major hypotheses I raised, which are the positive 
relationship between less reputable VC-backing and longer lockup agreement and less 
negative return abnormality and abnormal volume for more reputable VC-backing 
companies. These two empirical results strengthen the conjecture that reputation 
functions as a mechanism to alleviate the information asymmetry to some extent. 
 
However, this is just the first step to connect reputation effect during prior and post- 
IPO period, more researches on the intermediate function of reputation could be done, 
such as its role in strengthening corporate governance. It would be interesting to 
discuss reputation effect throughout the whole IPO timeline. 
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 Figure 1: The Parallel Theoretical Development of Lockup and VC Reputation 
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 Figure 2: Overall VC-backed IPO Market 
 
Data source on IPO size are from SDC Global New Issues during the period 1998 to 
2007, with VC-banking flag to be yes, which means we are not comparing 
VC-backing or non VC-backing IPO market in this paper. Rather, we are taking a 
more profound insight into the VC-backing IPO market and delve into the relationship 
within VC-backing IPOs. The IPO size is calculated from IPO proceeds, as 
documented by SDC database. All figures are quoted in millions and we exclude all 
issues that are REITs, ADRs or other non-conventional IPOs. Moreover, we exclude 
IPOs with offer price less than $5 following the convention of IPO literature. Finally, 
the data are limited to US market only. 
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 Table 1: Descriptions on Reputation Candidates, Lockup Days and Control 
Variables 
Reputation Candidates  Description 
Prior Experience 
Prior experience is approximated by VC age and asset 
under management. VC age is calculated by the 
difference between VC's incorporation date to IPO date 
and AUM data is directly accessible from SDC 
database. 
                 
Investment Intensity 
It captures the deal-specific aspect which could be 
approximated by average investment and average round 
investment which are indirect implication on VCs' 
reputation 
             
Control Variable  Description 
Ln Size 
The natural log of the size of the IPO, which is 
approximated by the proceeds from the IPO. Data is 
available from SDC. 
                 
Ln Age 
The natural log of the issuers' age, which is calculated as 
the difference between its incorporation date and IPO 
date. Moreover, incorporation date data is available 
from Jay Ritter's IPO website 
                 
Techdummy 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the industry sector for 
a certain issuing company is in technology and 0 if not.
                 
COINV 
The number of co-investors in the initial public 
offerings which is a proxy for the networking effect the 
issuers have. 
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 Table 2: Simple Statistics on Lockup Days 
Lockup days data are documented in SDC database and we exclude those IPOs who report a 
missing value in lockup days. Moreover, we use a new variable lockup flag (LKPFLG) to label 1 
to IPOs with a lockup agreement equal or longer than 180 days while label 0 to IPOs with a 
lockup agreement shorter than 180 days. The percentage of raw data and LKPFLG data are 
presented in Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: 
Lockup Days  LKPFL
G 
Frequency Percentage 
Others  0  3365  42.83 
180 Days or larger 1  4491  57.17 
 
Panel B: 
Cumulative Cumulative  LKPDAY Frequency  Percent
Frequency  Percent 
0  2914  37.09  2914  37.09 
15  20  0.25  2934  37.35 
45  7  0.09  2941  37.44 
60  4  0.05  2945  37.49 
80  6  0.08  2951  37.56 
90  333  4.24  3284  41.8 
100  12  0.15  3296  41.96 
120  6  0.08  3302  42.03 
150  14  0.18  3316  42.21 
180  4491  57.17  7807  99.38 
181  4  0.05  7811  99.43 
270  6  0.08  7817  99.5 
360  19  0.24  7836  99.75 
365  9  0.11  7845  99.86 
540  11  0.14  7856  100 
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 Table 3: Descriptive Analysis on Reputation Candidates, Lockup Variables and 
Control Variables 
The reputation candidates generally fall into two groups: firm-specific prior 
experience and deal-specific syndication investment intensity. Within each group, we 
use two candidates, VC age (VCAGE) and asset under management (AUM) for prior 
experience; average investment (AVGINV) and average round investment (RNDINV) 
by VCs for investment intensity. The control variables include IPO size (SIZE), 
issuing company age (AGE), information technology dummy (TECHDUMMY) and 
number of firms who are investing in the same IPO (COINV). We report the mean, 
median, standard deviation and the rang under 90% confidence interval. The more 
detailed discussion on min and max of each variables are singled out in the main text.   
 
Lower 
90% 
Upper 
90% 
Variable  Mean  Median Std Dev
CL for 
Mean 
CL for 
Mean 
Reputation Variable           
Prior Experience           
VCAGE  19.1  16.55  14.27  18.84  19.37 
AUM (in millions)  2895.9  750  6916.99 2738.82  3052.98 
Syndication Investment Intensity           
AVGINV (in thousands)  7319.56 5381.8  11134.7  7112.86  7526.26 
RNDINV (in thousands)  4489.83 3126.5  8254.1  4336.6  4643.05 
           
Lockup Variable           
LKPDAY  109.74  180  88.58  108.1  111.38 
           
Control Variable           
SIZE  91.07  67.5  124.49  88.76  93.38 
AGE  35.72  34.77  2.48  35.67  35.78 
TECHDUMMY  0.66  1  0.47  0.65  0.67 
COINV  10.9  10  5.12  10.89  11.08 
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 Table 4: Correlation Analysis for Reputation Candidates 
The correlation analysis is conducted for the four VC reputation candidates we are 
using. The correlation is reported with Pearson correlation coefficient and Spearman 
correlation coefficient.   
 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
    VCAGE AUM  AVGINV RNDINV 
VCAGE  1.00         
                   
AUM  0.12    1.00       
                   
AVGINV  -0.01    0.36    1.00     
                   
RNDINV  -0.04    0.32    0.95    1.00   
                   
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
  VCAGE AUM  AVGINV RNDINV 
VCAGE  1.00       
        
AUM  0.30    1.00      
        
AVGINV  0.01    0.59    1.00     
        
RNDINV  -0.14    0.38    0.85    1.00   
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 Table 5: Reputation Candidate and Control Variable Characteristics 
This table reports the relationship between various control variables and reputation 
candidates we employ. The basis equation to test their relationship is 
01 2 3 4 t t REPUTATION LNSIZE LNAGE TECHdUMMY COINV β βββ β =+ + + + + ε  
where  0 β  represents a vector of fixed year effect while  1 β  to  4 β  represents the 
partial effect of different control variables. Dependent Variable REPUTATION 
includes the prior experience candidate and syndication investment intensity 
candidate, which are the four reputation candidates we are assessing 
 
Reputation Variables  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy Coinvestor  Adjusted R-square
Prior Experience          
VC Age  -0.05**  1.20***  0.10***  -0.01***  13.90% 
  (0.02)  (0.23)  (0.03)  (0.00)   
Asset Under Management  0.18*** -1.54*** 0.19**  -0.03***  10.50% 
  (0.06)  (0.53)  (0.08)  (0.01)   
Syndication Investment 
Intensity 
        
Average Investment  0.13*** -0.16  0.04*  -0.01***  18.40% 
  (0.02)  (0.16)  (0.02)  (0.00)   
Average Round Investment  0.15*** 0.05  0.01  -0.01***  22.50% 
  (0.02)  (0.17)  (0.02)  (0.00)   
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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 Table 6: Univariate Simple Regression Analysis 
The univariate model looks at the relationship between the reputation variables and 
LKPDAY, excluding various control variables. The regression is depicted as the 
following equation employing all the reputation candidates: 
01 tt LKPDAY REPUTATION t β βε = ++  
t-statistic and the adjusted t-statistic after applying Newey-West test are reported in 
the table to correct for heteroskadesticity and autocorrelation problems. The 
significance is marked with asterisk. 
 
  VC Age  AUM  Avg Inv  Rnd Inv 
-7.03771 -2.84682 -5.82935 -4.99081 
OLS 
1.02199  0.64081  1.38709  1.31018 
t-statistic  -6.89  -4.44  -4.20  -3.81 
NW adjusted  6.01***  -4.13***  -3.94***  -3.48*** 
 
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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 Table 7: Univariate Linear Probability, Probit and Logit Model Analysis 
The univariate model looks at the relationship between the reputation variables and 
LKPFLG where linear probability, probit and logit estimation is exploited respectively. 
The regression is depicted as in the following equation: 
01 tt LKPFLG REPUTATION t β βε = ++  
where LKPFLG takes 1 if the lockup days is equal or larger than 180 days while 0 if 
the lockup days is less than 180 days. The residual term is assumed to follow probit 
and logistic distributions. 
 
  VC Age  AUM  Avg Inv  Rnd Inv 
-0.079*** -0.036*** -0.077*** -0.068*** 
Probit 
0.015  0.009  0.020  0.019 
      
-0.127*** -0.058*** -0.123*** -0.110*** 
Logit 
0.023  0.015  0.032  0.030 
      
0.031*** -0.014*** -0.030*** -0.027*** 
LP 
0.006  0.004  0.008  0.007 
 
All results are significant under various significance levels. 
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 Table 8: Multivariate Simple Regression Analysis 
The multivariate model looks at the relationship between the reputation variables and 
LKPFLG, controlling the effect of various control variables. The regression is 
depicted as the following equation employing all the reputation candidates: 
01 2 3 4 5 t t LKPDAY REPUTATION LNSIZE LNAGE TECHdUMMY COINV β ββ β ββ =+ + + + + + ε
 
Panel A            
  VC Age  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy  Coinvestor  Adj-R 
0.56  -36.56  563.29  2.78  -1.55  0.22 
OLS 
(1.08)  (1.91)  (18.37)  (2.66)  (0.22)   
t-statistic  0.52  -19.14  30.66  1.04  -7.00   
NW-adjusted  0.44  -9.53  19.51  0.53  -3.91   
            
Panel B            
  AUM  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy  Coinvestor  Adj-R 
-1.64  -37.22  574.33  4.38  -1.45  0.23 
OLS 
(0.70)  (2.33)  (22.44)  (3.23)  (0.27)   
t-statistic  -2.34  -16.00  25.59  1.35  -5.42   
NW-adjusted  -2.19**  -8.10  16.26  0.70  -3.17   
            
            
Panel C            
  AVRINV  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy  Coinvestor  Adj-R 
-3.61  -35.84  563.45  2.96  -1.57  0.22 
OLS 
(1.55)  (1.91)  (18.28)  (2.64)  (0.22)   
t-statistic  -2.33  -18.73  30.82  1.12  -7.12   
NW-adjusted  -2.22**  -9.36  19.67  0.57  -4.00   
            
            
Panel D            
  RNDINV  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy  Coinvestor  Adj-R 
-3.32  -35.82  564.21  3.15  -1.57  0.22 
OLS 
(1.46)  (1.92)  (18.28)  (2.64)  (0.22)   
t-statistic  -2.27  -18.70  30.86  1.19  -7.13   
NW-adjusted  -2.10**  -9.35  19.71  0.61  -4.01   
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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01 2 3 4 5 t t LKPFLG REPUTATION LNSIZE LNAGE TECHdUMMY COINV
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where LKPFLG takes 1 if the lockup days is equal or larger than 180 days while 0 if 
the lockup days is less than 180 days. The residual term is assumed to follow probit 
and logistic distributions. 
The multivariate model looks at the relationship between the reputation variables and 
LKPFLG, controlling the effect of various control variables. The regression is 
depicted as the following equation: 
 
Table 9: Multivariate Linear Probability, Probit and Logit Analysis 
β ββ β ββ ε =+ + + + + +
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Panel A              Panel C        
  VC Age  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy  Coinvestor    Avg Inv  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy Coinvestor 
-0.0051  0.4248***  -7.9606*** -0.0017  0.0174***    -0.0517*** 0.4149***  -7.954***  -0.0051  0.0178*** 
Probit 
(0.0176)  (0.0322)  (0.3435)  (0.0437)  (0.0037)    (0.0255)  (0.0322)  (0.3417)  (0.0434)  (0.0037) 
                
-0.00902  -0.7448***  13.6086*** 0.0244  -0.0317***    -0.0883*** -0.7274*** 13.5908*** 0.0303  0.0324*** 
Logit 
(0.0287)  (0.0554)  (0.6192)  (0.0723)  (0.00612)    (0.0421)  (0.0553)  (0.6159)  (0.0717)  (0.00609) 
                 
0.00201  -0.15094  2.64732*** 0.00023035 -0.00636***   -0.01867** -0.1477*** 2.64631*** 0.00144  -0.00649*** 
LP 
(0.00615)  (0.01091)  (0.10493)  (0.01519)  (0.00126)    (0.00885) (0.01093)  (0.10437) (0.01508) (0.00126) 
                       
Panel B              Panel D        
  AUM  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy  Coinvestor    Rnd Inv  Ln Size  Ln Age  Techdummy Coinvestor 
-0.0233*** 0.4387***  -8.2302*** -0.0042  0.0173***    -0.0487*** 0.4144***  -7.9657*** -0.0079  0.0178*** 
Probit 
(0.0115)  (0.0397)  (0.4254)  (0.0534)  (0.0045)    (0.024)  (0.0322)  (0.3418)  (0.0434)  (0.0037) 
                 
-0.0409*** -0.7639***  14.0454*** 0.0231  -0.0315***    -0.0835*** 0.7265***  13.6125*** 0.0348  -0.0325*** 
Logit 
(0.019)  (0.0681)  (0.7667)  (0.0883)  (0.00747)    (0.0396)  (0.0553)  (0.6162)  (0.0717)  (0.00609) 
                 
-0.00847** -0.15343***  2.70246*** 0.00069178 -0.00631***   -0.01764** -0.14753*** 2.65023*** 0.00238  -0.00651*** 
LP 
(0.00398)  (0.01326)  (0.12794)  (0.01843)  (0.00152)    (0.00834) (0.01093)  (0.10436) (0.01508) (0.00126) 
                   
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1 % significance levels respectively.Table 10: CAAR for IPOs with Higher and Lower Reputation 
The CAAR is calculated as the equation (6) and the associated t-statistic is shown in 
equation (7).   
 
Panel A       
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
VC AGE>Median  -1.73%  -1.29%  -2.07%  -3.62%* -5.21% 
t-statistic  -0.56    -0.90   -1.05   -1.59   -1.38  
       
VC AGE<Median  -1.94%  -2.33%  -4.30%*** -3.48%* -6.79%* 
t-statistic  -0.87    -1.35   -2.35   -1.78   -1.75  
       
Panel B       
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
AUM>Median  -1.71%  -3.41%* -2.39%** -3.54%* -6.27%*** 
t-statistic  -0.56    -1.83   -1.95   -1.62   -2.63  
       
AUM<Median  -2.07%*  -3.25%* -4.09%*** -4.31%  -7.87%*** 
t-statistic  -1.67    -1.76   -2.44   -1.06   -2.49  
       
Panel C       
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
AVGINV>Median  -2.86%  -2.64%** -4.40%*** -0.45%  -1.76% 
t-statistic  -0.74    -2.04   -2.40   -0.36   -0.52  
       
AVGINV<Median  -3.29%*  -2.47%* -6.82%*** -2.09%  -3.71% 
t-statistic  -1.47    -1.36   -3.61   -0.89   -1.32  
       
Panel D       
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
RNDINV>Median  -3.80%*  -1.45%  -6.60%** -2.50%* -1.77% 
t-statistic  -1.87    -0.76   -2.68   -1.28   -0.57  
       
RNDINV<Median  -4.67%*** -1.33%  -7.80%*** -2.37%  -1.89% 
t-statistic  -2.44    -0.43   -2.54   -0.95   -0.63  
   
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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 Table 11: DAAV for IPOs with Higher and Lower Reputation 
The DAAV is calculated as the equation (8) and the associated t-statistic is shown in 
equation (9). 
 
Panel A        
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
VC AGE>Median 17%*  21%**  33%*  27%***  18% 
t-statistic  1.32    2.18   1.86   2.47   1.07  
       
VC AGE<Median 22%  34%**  30%  51%*  17%* 
t-statistic  0.91    2.06   1.09   1.58   1.41  
        
Panel B        
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
AUM>Median  11%  25%*  35%***  49%*  21%* 
t-statistic  0.38    1.63   2.73   1.52   1.31  
        
AUM<Median  8%  36%***  57%***  33%*  31%* 
t-statistic  0.75    2.14   2.67   1.82   1.45  
        
Panel C        
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
AVGINV>Median 19%  17%  26%**  16%***  35% 
t-statistic  1.36    0.92   2.33   3.35   1.04  
        
AVGINV<Median 21%  32%*  31%***  24%  29% 
t-statistic  1.57    1.80   3.54   2.47   0.76  
        
Panel D        
    [-10,-1]  [-5,-1]  [-1,1]  [1,5]  [5,10] 
RNDINV>Median 7%  13%*  18%**  14%***  17% 
t-statistic  2.17    1.57   1.98   3.21   1.06  
        
RNDINV<Median 5%  19%*  27%**  20%***  37%** 
t-statistic  1.03    1.46   2.14   2.51   2.32  
   
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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 Table 12: CAAR and DAAV for IPOs with Quartile Reputation 
The CAAR is calculated as the equation (6) and the associated t-statistic is shown in 
equation (7). The DAAV is calculated as the equation (8) and the associated t-statistic 
is shown in equation (9). 
 
Panel A    
VC AGE  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quartile  -4.14%  31% 
2nd Quartile  -5.47%** 40%* 
3rd Quartile  -4.65%*** 24%** 
4th Quartile  -4.88%*  27%* 
      
Panel B    
AUM  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quartile  -2.17%** 24%** 
2nd Quartile  -2.37%*  45%*** 
3rd Quartile  -4.29%** 59%*** 
4th Quartile  -5.54%*** 52%*** 
      
Panel C    
AVGINV  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quartile  -3.25%*** 18%* 
2nd Quartile  -5.10%*** 29%* 
3rd Quartile  -6.82%*** 35%*** 
4th Quartile  -5.10%*** 37%** 
      
Panel D    
RNDINV  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quartile  -5.60%*  17%** 
2nd Quartile  -7.10%*** 21%*** 
3rd Quartile  -6.73%*** 25%** 
4th Quartile  -7.28%** 30%*** 
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
 
 
 
 
 
  60 
 
 Appendix A: Typical Lockup Agreements 
 
Example 1: 
 
 
 
 
Example 2: 
 
 
The Selling Securityholders agree that, without your (the investment bank’s )
prior written consent, the Selling Securityholders will not, directly or indirectly,
sell, offer, contract to sell, make any short sale, pledge or otherwise dispose of
any shares of Common Stock or any securities convertible into or exercisable for
or any rights to purchase or acquire Common Stock for a period of 180 days
following the commencement of the public offering of the Stock by the
Underwriters.   
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Appendix B: Robustness Check with Different Divisions 
CAAR and DAAV for IPOs with Different Divisions 
The CAAR is calculated as the equation (6) and the associated t-statistic is shown in 
equation (7). The DAAV is calculated as the equation (8) and the associated t-statistic 
is shown in equation (9). 
 
Panel A    
VC AGE  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Division  -2.36%  11%** 
2nd Division  -3.07%** 9%* 
3rd Division  -1.67%  13% 
      
Panel B    
AUM  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Division  -4.53%** 26%*** 
2nd Division  -5.81%*  31%*** 
3rd Division  -6.47%*** 44%*** 
      
Panel C    
AVGINV  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Division  -3.25%*  17% 
2nd Division  -3.36%** 38%*** 
3rd Division  -5.27%*** 31%*** 
      
Panel D    
RNDINV  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Division  -4.90%*** 20%* 
2nd Division  -6.38%*** 41%*** 
3rd Division  -6.03%*** 47%*** 
 
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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The CAAR is calculated as the equation (6) and the associated t-statistic is shown in 
equation (7). The DAAV is calculated as the equation (8) and the associated t-statistic 
is shown in equation (9). 
Panel A    
VC AGE  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quintile  -1.93%  5% 
2nd Quintile  -2.04%** 12%** 
3rd Quintile  -1.84%** 8% 
4th Quintile  -1.57%  7% 
5th Quintile  -2.51%*** 11%* 
      
Panel B    
AUM  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quintile  -2.39%*  18%** 
2nd Quintile  -3.61%*** 20%* 
3rd Quintile  -4.51%*** 31%*** 
4th Quintile  -3.28%*** 15%* 
5th Quintile  -4.79%*** 34%*** 
      
Panel C    
AVGINV  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quintile  -3.00%*** 10% 
2nd Quintile  -4.18%*** 27%*** 
3rd Quintile  -4.01%  24%** 
4th Quintile  -3.87%*** 22%** 
5th Quintile  -5.60%*** 42%*** 
      
Panel D    
RNDINV  [-1,1]  [-1,1] 
1st Quintile  -2.09%  7% 
2nd Quintile  -5.13%*** 35%*** 
3rd Quintile  -7.32%*** 40%*** 
4th Quintile  -7.68%*** 43%*** 
5th Quintile  -5.12%*** 33%*** 
 
* ,
** ,
*** , denote coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% 
and 1 % significance levels respectively.
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